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Chapter 1 
The Beginning of A New Movement 
 
Introduction - The Umbrella Revolution 
On 28 September, 2014, Hong Kong, one of the world’s most affluent financial 
centers, exploded into an unexpected outburst of civil unrest. Galvanized by popular 
support, tens of thousands of protesters from all levels of society poured into the streets, 
blocking major roads and paralyzing the city’s central financial district, in the hopes of 
achieving universal suffrage by 2017. As the standoff between the police and protesters 
intensified, authorities decided to crackdown on public defiance due to an increased 
number of people joining the demonstration. As night fell, the peaceful pro-democracy 
movement was clashed with the police force in riot gear. The police entered the protest 
scene with batons, tear gas and pepper spray to fend off protesters. The use of yellow 
umbrellas as defenses by the infuriated masses to protect themselves against 
lachrymatory devices caused the demonstration to be later named as the “Umbrella 
Revolution.” 
The very first days of the movement started off with Occupy Central With Love 
and Peace. Mainly composed of college students, the Hong Kong Federation of Students 
managed to organize a series of town-hall meetings that initially had 700 participants. As 
the movement gained more momentum, student leader Joshua Wong also joined the 
force. “‘Rather than reject the things that we don’t want, we want to fight for the things 
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we want,’ [mentioned Wong.] The movement, he felt, belonged to the students.”1 This 
young boy with a bowl haircut staged a hunger strike prior to the Occupy Central protest, 
stormed onto the stage in front of the Legislative Council, and shouted out his plans into 
a microphone. Unfortunately, his actions had little effect on Beijing’s leadership, and 
only led to Wong’s arrest by the Hong Kong police force.  
When footage of police arrests surfaced online, including that of Wong’s, the 
public became appalled and outraged. In fact, the most unnerving feature of deteriorating 
democracy is the erosion of a sense of moral justice. It signified a monumental collapse 
of hope, safety, and trust. It marked the beginning of a frightened community in search of 
a quest for a better collective destiny. Following Wong’s footsteps, thousands of students 
felt the need to take the movement into their own hands. For them, the movement is more 
than just fighting for democratic ideologies; it is about preserving the values and 
principles of being Hong Kongese. A year after the revolution, the people of Hong Kong 
have come to realize that the revolution itself has transformed into a powerful symbol of 
solidarity and liberalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Hilgers,	  Lauren.	  "Hong	  Kong’s	  Umbrella	  Revolution	  Isn’t	  Over	  Yet."	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  21	  Feb.	  2015.	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Historical Background 
As the 20th century of Chinese modern history finished off with the speedy return 
of Hong Kong to the mainland, scholars and thinkers continue to define and redefine the 
problem of identity for Hong Kong people in an era of constant change. After much 
vicissitude of its transition, many Hong Kong people have been awakened from their dark 
days of political hibernation, and begun to develop not only political consciousness, but 
gradually roused to political actions.  
Hong Kong is defined as “Fragrant Harbor” in Chinese, so named because of its 
deep natural harbors nurturing over seven million people on the densely populated 
island.2 As one of the most popular travel destinations in Asia, Hong Kong is a dynamic 
city, fused by traditional and contemporary values, and a mixture of Eastern and Western 
cultural influences. The former British colony today is once again faced with Beijing’s 
“colonization” of its politics and economy. From an international relations point of view, 
Hong Kong has always been a devoted follower of the West, endorsing civil liberties and 
free-market capitalism. Yet, the issue of democracy has torn the once tranquil and 
politically apathetic island apart, transforming it into its own sovereign being. The 
political dependency of Hong Kong relies not simply on its former colonial lord or 
present sovereign master, but on its own hands. In the last few years, we have seen an 
increasing polarization over what kind of political system should Hong Kong have as a 
Special Administrative Region of China. 
        After 156 years of British occupation, Hong Kong is once again a part of 
China.  In September 1984, Communist China and the United Kingdom signed the Sino-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  "World	  Development	  Indicators."	  Google	  Public	  Data	  Explorer.	  World	  Bank,	  16	  Oct.	  2015.	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British Declaration, which allowed the Chinese government to resume its exercise of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. Under the agreement, “One Country, Two 
Systems” was proposed as a resolution to the reunification problem, as it “provides a 
rational mechanism for the coexistence of … contradictory systems: socialism on the 
mainland, [and] capitalism in Hong Kong.” 3  However, under “One Country, Two 
Systems,” Hong Kong is verily losing its ground. China now is a nation on its stellar rise 
to the world’s stage, with phenomenal growth rates in the economic sector. Often 
unloved and misunderstood, the country gives off the impression of achieving objectives 
through carrots and sticks, instead of capitalizing on warm sentiments. 4  Beijing’s 
leadership have sought to reverse this negative image through various channels, including 
the expansion of foreign aid and forging multilateral cooperation in the region.  
Under the current political climate, China has been increasingly exercising “soft 
power” in terms of cultivating cultural diplomacy and national marketing. In fact, China’s 
new diplomatic efforts have greatly enhanced its status as a regional power in the Asian 
community. During President Xi’s speech in the 2015 military parade, he pledged his 
country would “never seek hegemony or expansion. It will never inflict its past suffering 
on any other nation.”5 Although the majority of the Western media may doubt the 
authenticity of Xi’s statements or simply regard it as lip service, such statements sought 
to soften tension and enforce cooperation are certainly favorable to its foreign relations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Chao,	  Chien-­‐Min.	  "“One	  Country,	  Two	  Systems”."	  Asian	  Affairs:	  An	  American	  Review	  14.2	  (1987):	  107-­‐24.	  4	  Moss,	  Trefor.	  "Soft	  Power?	  China	  Has	  Plenty."	  The	  Diplomat.	  04	  June	  2013.	  	  5	  Phipps,	  Claire.	  "China	  Military	  Parade	  Commemorates	  Second	  World	  War	  Victory	  –	  as	  It	  Happened."	  
The	  Guardian.	  3	  Sept.	  2015.	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Over the past few years, Beijing has gradually and systematically increased its 
grip over the city, avoiding direct challenges while focusing on experimentation of the 
system. Contrary to Beijing’s expectations for cultural and economic assimilation, the 
two regions have only been growing apart. The reunification has brought to us a series of 
conflicts in the social, political and economic realms. Hence, contemporary values and 
norms of Hong Kong society are constantly being shaken up and incrementally 
supplanted by Chinese institutions and socioeconomic structures. 
 
 
Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 
The relationship between Hong Kong and the mainland is often complex; the 
century-long separation between the two regions has generated major social and political 
gaps that are strenuous to bridge. Legally speaking, there are five major differences 
between Hong Kong and mainland China.  
 
1. HKSAR passport holders are granted visa-free access or visa-on-arrival to visit 
152 countries, whereas Chinese passport holders only have access to 45 countries 
visa free.6  
2. Hong Kong runs on a different currency. Since the primary objective in Hong 
Kong’s monetary policy is to maintain economic stability, the Hong Kong dollar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  "Visa-­‐free	  Access	  for	  HKSAR	  Passport."	  Visa-­‐free	  Access	  for	  HKSAR	  Passport.	  Immigration	  Department.	  Web.	  19	  Jan.	  2016.	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has a linked exchange rate system that connects to the U.S. dollar. On the other 
hand, the renminbi is the official currency of the People's Republic of China.  
3. The official languages of Hong Kong include English and Cantonese. However, 
Hong Kong’s official written language uses traditional, instead of simplified 
Chinese characters. Whereas in mainland China, the government has adopted 
simplified characters since the 1950s in an attempt to improve literacy rates. Even 
today, the debate on traditional Chinese characters and simplified Chinese 
characters is still ongoing, and has escalated fervent responses among users of 
Chinese characters with its implications of political ideology and cultural identity. 
4. Human rights are protected under the Basic Law of Hong Kong, guaranteeing a 
wide range of freedoms, from freedom of speech and press to the freedom of 
assembly. Hong Kong and Macau are the only regions in China where people can 
freely access Facebook, Twitter and other popular social media websites.  
5. Lastly, Hong Kong’s commitment to small government and laissez faire 
economic policies has allowed the city to become one of the world’s most 
prosperous economies, attracting major business investments in financial services 
and shipping. In mainland China, the lines between public and private sectors are 
blurred. A form of controlled, state-managed capitalism keeps both sectors active 
and aggressive. 
 
In the following chapters, I will discuss how these legal differences between 
Hong Kong and the mainland unfold social, political, and economic conflicts as 
Beijing imposes mainland-style policies to facilitate assimilation.  
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Emergence of a New Identity 
While Beijing still plays a crucial role in its attempt to exercise political control 
over Hong Kong, the potent and omnipresent forces of modernization and globalization 
constantly questions the narrow definitions of national and individual identity of Hong 
Kong people. Strategies of “mainlandization” imposed by Beijing have continuously 
aimed at assimilating Hong Kong into Chinese society. However, similar to the law of 
physics, wherever there is an action force, there must also be a reaction force 
counterbalancing it. These forceful transformations of political hegemony after the 
transition of sovereignty required the destruction of traditional Hong Kong culture and 
lifestyles.  
Hong Kong’s identity crisis has been brewing into a multidimensional epidemic 
waiting to explode. And yet, the only conditions that are postponing this apocalyptic time 
bomb are short-term economic incentives and constant social changes that leave no room 
or time for spiritual contemplation. People continue to enjoy a love-hate relationship with 
the popular culture of crass materialism, fast-frozen human relations, and spiritual void. 
The rags-to-riches phenomenon leads many to question the values and meanings of 
wealth; they strive to trace back to the old cultural traditions. A sense of nostalgia has 
always lingered in Hong Kong society. There is a sense of unwillingness to alter the 
ideological landscape, along with a faint hope for a better tomorrow.  
Today’s political conditions present to us a new form of reality. Youth 
populations in Hong Kong start to question the logic behind nihilistic nostalgia. Hong 
Kong’s outstanding economic performances in the past no longer quench the desires for 
the new generation to search for a political consciousness, a democratic mind. “While the 
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Hong Kong government intentionally misinterprets the movement as simply a kind of 
social movement that can be solved by paying attention to specific policy issues, this is a 
political movement that is reshaping the ideological landscape of Hong Kong.”7 Political 
movements such as the Umbrella Revolution not only function as a protest for political 
discontent, but also demonstrate a powerful ability to reconfigure hegemony through 
collective action, as well as expand the potential of forms of rebellion under systematic 
oppression. 
The explosion of an identity crisis in Hong Kong is a recent phenomenon. It has 
raised important questions regarding Chinese despotism in the region and possible 
counter-hegemonic expressions. Will Hong Kong become the next Taiwan? Or will 
Taiwan become the next Hong Kong? The challenge of discussing the Hong Kongnese 
identity is that the nuances are often misconstrued under the Western gaze. Westerners 
tend to see more similarities than differences between people of Chinese descent, and fail 
to acknowledge the numerous privileges and complexities embedded in these identities.  
As certain regions in Asia become increasingly westernized, anti-Chinese 
sentiments have also become more pronounced. The economic takeoff in China has 
altered the social and political relations between Hong Kong and the mainland, producing 
a new Chinese identity that is amplified and constantly transforming. Hence, the 
ramification of Hong Kong’s transfer of sovereignty is that its political dependence 
towards China becomes more sensitive and such conditions can result in a larger societal 
change.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Kung,	  Lap	  Yan.	  "Occupy	  Central,	  Umbrella	  Movement,	  and	  Democracy	  -­‐	  Syndicate	  Theology."	  
Syndicate	  Theology.	  30	  Nov.	  2014.	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Prior to 1997, a revolutionary route to democracy through protests and uprisings 
was unthinkable. There has been a persistent pragmatic and apolitical culture that 
prevents the radical wind from blowing through the city. In fact, “Hong Kong was one of 
the few deviant countries that were high on the Human Development Index but 
undemocratic in 1990.”8 However, the Umbrella Revolution is often interpreted as a 
democratization movement by the local news and Western media. Moreover, a broader 
undercurrent of social movements have been ongoing even before the revolution last 
year, such as the major demonstration in 2003 on Article 23 of the Basic Law, and the 
annual gathering at Victoria Park in remembrance of the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre. As a result, academics and lawmakers start to expand their understandings of 
the political aspirations of Hong Kong people for democracy.  
Contrary to the popular opinion, the vast differences in social, political, and 
economic realms between the Hong Kong and mainland China have exemplified cultural 
meanings that extend beyond democracy. I argue that the Umbrella Revolution in Hong 
Kong is more than just democratization - it reflects a larger identity crisis that 
differentiates the Hong Kong from Chinese. The democratic movement has implications 
more than universal suffrage – it concerns distinctions of cultural identity and political 
ideologies of what it means to be Hong Kongnese.  
 Most past research on the democratization of Hong Kong has been generally 
concerned about on the ramifications of institutional power dynamics, and aimed to 
inform an audience whose primary interests were in China. Accordingly, understandings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Hsin-­‐Chi,	  Kuan,	  and	  Lau	  Siu-­‐Kai.	  "The	  Partial	  Vision	  of	  Democracy	  in	  Hong	  Kong:	  A	  Survey	  of	  Popular	  Opinion."	  The	  China	  Journal	  34	  (1995):	  239-­‐64.	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of the culture and society of Hong Kong becomes limited, as they serve to support an 
argument for or against Chinese regional despotism. From public media coverage to 
scholarship articles, very little attention has been paid to the transformations of Hong 
Kong at the individual level. In a society that has been through constant social, economic 
and political transformations in the past decades, Hong Kong has developed a rich culture 
that demands analysis beyond the surface. This thesis focuses on the development of a 
unique Hong Kongese identity and its implications on the ongoing democratic movement. 
The following chapters will establish conceptual and empirical relations between cultural 
identities and political dissent in an attempt to form a dialogue for the understanding of 
local contextual complexities and global linkages of democratic movements in Hong 
Kong.  
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Chapter 2 
Interpretations of the Umbrella Revolution 
 
Introduction 
On the core issue of democracy, discrepancies in the narrative of value and vision 
surface between the Central Government and Hong Kong people. In the wake of the 
recent democratic movement, it has become clear that the discrepancies are not simply a 
result of misunderstanding or misconceptions, but an intentional charade of power play in 
the pursuit of realist interests, for Beijing “knows too well in the pluralistic nature of 
Hong Kong society, … [and] acted quickly to quell the heated controversies.”9 In short, 
the logic behind Beijing’s political narratives has failed to convince the hearts and minds 
of Hong Kong people. Hong Kong’s vision of democracy, on the other hand, has been 
widely denounced as an upsurge for civil disobedience and chaos. Hence, the Umbrella 
Revolution has unfolded numerous interpretations from both sides of the argument. 
While the Western media has widely supported the movement, Chinese sources indicate 
otherwise. In the meantime, another theory has emerged in an attempt to evaluate the 
issue. It concerns the implications of cultural identity on the democratic movement. 
Broadly speaking, the voices behind the interpretations can be categorized into three 
basic approaches: government position, democratic movement theory, and the ethnic 
identity theory.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Zheng,	  Yushuo,	  and	  Chor-­‐yung	  Cheung.	  New	  Trends	  of	  Political	  Participation	  in	  Hong	  Kong.	  Hong	  Kong:	  City	  U	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  2014.	  p.	  65.	  Print.	  
	  	  
15	  
 In this chapter, all three interpretations will be incorporated into the discussion of 
the legal, intuitional, and ideological implications of the Umbrella Revolution. Concepts 
such as sovereignty, legitimacy, and the logic behind democratic movements will be 
explored in detail. I address the significant players in this conversation, such as the 
Central Government, the C.Y. Leung administration, Occupy Central, the University of 
Hong Kong, etc., as they all serve to dismantle the problem of “One Country, Two 
Systems” from various angles. While the government position and democratic movement 
theory strives to take center stage on the debate for universal suffrage and electoral 
reform, I argue that the ethnic identity theory examines the issue in a different light, and 
provides a more realistic framework in understanding the manifestations of cultural 
identities in the ongoing political currents of Hong Kong society.  
 
 
Government Position 
As the trends of political participation in Hong Kong transform and evolve at a 
rapid pace, Beijing’s leadership has also altered their rhetoric in addressing issues related 
to sovereignty and autonomy of the Special Administrative Region. While the Central 
Government has been largely silent on the movement itself, preventing all Chinese media 
from reporting on the protests, Beijing has also utilized state-run media to deliver its 
voices.10 Under the government position, Beijing’s leadership has raised three major 
concerns. In order to win over international sympathy, Beijing has played the role of the 
victim in its political narratives on the movement. First, Beijing used the strategy of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Huntsman,	  Jon.	  "China's	  Hong	  Kong	  Dilemma."	  CNN.	  Cable	  News	  Network,	  2	  Oct.	  2014.	  Web.	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associating the Occupy Central movement to a radical opposition group, identifying their 
commonalities in the forms of illegal conducts, violent mannerisms, and separatist 
ideologies. Beijing’s stance was directed at denouncing and dismissing the democratic 
movement as a handful of radicals stirring up the public.11 This line of reasoning 
insinuates that the Occupy protesters do not want true democracy. Instead, they want “a 
democracy in the form of being independent of the influence of the Central 
Government.”12 Not only does this argument oversimplify the motivations and principles 
behind the movement, and equate the pursuit of democracy to the pursuit of 
independence, Beijing has also viewed the movement as a demonstration of antagonism 
against China, instead of dissatisfaction toward the political system in place. To be fair, 
there is a small minority of supporters for Hong Kong’s political independence. These 
supporters publically dispute patriotic ideologies and are usually referred to as bentupai 
(“home-soil faction”).13 However, majority of the protesters in the Umbrella Revolution 
do not identify with such ideas.  
Leaving aside whether the Umbrella Revolution was an act of civil disobedience, 
from a legal standpoint, the government position has questioned the basis of protesters’ 
political agenda. Beijing states that China has always abided by the basic principles of 
“One Country, Two Systems” and allowed for a “high level of autonomy” in the 
sovereign region. Therefore, claims of the Central Government violating such principles 
are groundless and incriminating. Moreover, this position states that “high level of 
autonomy" does not represent full autonomy, nor does the concept of “Hong Kong people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  "Keep	  Alert	  to	  ‘HK	  Independence’	  Rhetoric."	  Global	  Times.	  8	  Feb.	  2015.	  Web.	  	  12	  Nai-­‐keung,	  Lau.	  "'Umbrella	  Revolution'	  Finally	  Ends	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administering Hong Kong” come into conflict with Beijing’s jurisdiction over the city.14 
Beijing’s stance on the issue of sovereignty is inflexible and uncompromising; there is no 
room for interpretations other than the government position. From a paternalistic 
standpoint, the government position asserts that “One Country, Two Systems” is only 
intended to “safeguard the sovereignty, security and development of the whole Chinese 
nation.”15 They argue that following the nationalistic agenda and denouncing possibilities 
of nativism is for the benefit of Hong Kong as a whole. As a result, the 2017 chief 
executive election must also be conducted in accordance with the Basic Law, and comply 
with the constitutional principles of “One Country, Two Systems” for the sake of Hong 
Kong society.16  
The National People’s Congress (NPC) of Beijing offered a new interpretation of 
the Basic Law of Hong Kong. According to Guancha Syndicate, “despite what … the 
protesters have been crying out so loud China has not violated the Joint Declaration at 
all.”17 Under Article 3 (4) of the Joint Declaration, it states: 
The Chief executive will be appointed by the Central People’s Government on the 
basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally. 
Moreover, the notion of “universal suffrage” is a contemporary concept, nowhere to be 
found under the Sino-British treaty at that time. The concept was first introduced in the 
Basic Law, and put into effect when Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region 
of China on July 1, 1997. Article 45 of the Basic Law states: 	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The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the 
actual situation in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance 
with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the 
selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a 
broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic 
procedures. 
Hong Kong’s constitution, states Guancha Syndicate, “has stipulated very clearly 
that for universal suffrage as the ultimate aim to be materialized, a number of criteria 
have to be fulfilled: it has to look into the ‘actual situation,’ to follow the ‘principle of 
gradual and orderly progress,’ and to nominate candidates by a ‘nomination 
committee.’”18 In the present day situation, the power to define these three terms solely 
belongs to the Beijing. In late August of 2014, the Central Government reconfirmed that 
Hong Kong could achieve “universal suffrage” by 2017. This version of universal 
suffrage, however, is vastly different from what Hong Kong people desire. Although 
more than five million voters in Hong Kong would be able to participate in the “one man, 
one vote” election, they must select their candidates from a 1,200-member Beijing-
backed selection committee pool.  
From the government position, the protestors in the movement both disregard the 
legal procedures of democracy and demand a “civic nomination” that is not strictly 
introduced under the Basic Law. Under a civic nomination, the public will be able to 
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nominate candidates from any party, instead of the pool of Beijing-backed selection 
committee. Pro-democratic lawmakers in Hong Kong are determined to stand up against 
all odds in order to ensure that the selection committee is truly “broadly representative.” 
In fact, the “civic nomination” demand is particularly where the divide splits, as pro-
democracy activists named Beijing’s proposal a “fake universal suffrage.”   
Third, the government position states that political dissent in Hong Kong society 
is led by dissatisfaction toward internal social and economic issues, and that such issues 
are only a reflection of Hong Kong’s own deficiencies. Globalization and capitalistic 
market forces have largely benefited capital over labor, enlarging the rift between rich 
and poor, and generating numerous inefficiencies in the economy. However, the Central 
Government and even ordinary mainland citizens are being accused of causing these 
problems in Hong Kong.19 Internal social conflicts are an outcome of the problematic 
“economic structure and social contradictions,” which “cannot be resolved by diverting 
attention.”20 Thus, what Hong Kong lacks is an economic reform, not a political one.  
In a nutshell, the government position has been aiming at downplaying the 
significance of democracy and discrediting those who are behind the movement. Beijing 
would like to see a true reunification between mainland and Hong Kong, where people 
would put “One Country” before “Two Systems,” and uphold the status of patriotism in 
all regards. Nevertheless, the Umbrella Revolution still gained steam on the international 
stage. The remarkable display of collective political action by Hong Kong citizens 	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reflects that the movement itself is not simply backed by a handful of radicals, but tens of 
thousands of protesters who felt a profound sense of desperation toward the present 
societal conditions. People in Hong Kong believe that the Central Government has both 
interfered with Hong Kong’s internal affairs and extracted numerous economic benefits 
from the city, violating the Basic Law and eroding societal justice.  
 
Democratic Movement Theory 
Three major players emerge under the democratic movement theory: Occupy 
Central, Alliance for True Democracy, and People Power Party. In June 20, 2014, the 
Public Opinion Program at The University of Hong Kong (POP) and the Centre for 
Social Policy Studies at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University (CSPS) were 
commissioned by Occupy Central with Love and Peace to organize a Civil Referendum 
on the issues related to constitutional reform.21 All three groups submitted their proposals 
to the government for the chief executive election in 2017. One was required to be aged 
18 or above and a Hong Kong permanent resident in order to vote. The democratic 
referendum on universal suffrage garnered close to 800,000 participants, both local and 
overseas, indicating that one in five registered voters took part in this event. In short, the 
proposal by Alliance for True Democracy allows for the public, nominating committee 
and political parties to name candidates for the chief executive, and had a landslide 
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victory of 42.1% support.22 While the three proposals were relatively similar, the other 
two did not allow political parties to name candidates.  
Under the current political situation, the Hong Kong government understands that 
grievances and political sentiments in the community have been largely gathered by its 
own ineffectiveness and unpopularity. In addressing such grievances, the HKSAR 
government is hesitant to introduce political reforms, which on one hand may infuriate 
the Central Government in Beijing, and on the other add to the emotional burdens of 
Hong Kong people. Therefore, the Hong Kong government strives to maneuver around 
these two forces, and find a balance to please both. The C.Y. Leung administration, for 
instance, has only offered sweeteners to the public. The administration states that an 
important contribution would be made in the housing area; “but other than that, it is in a 
difficult position to deliver.”23 Hence, it is clear to see why such “sweeteners” only 
aroused more public anger, as it miserably fails to address the real issues, and has been 
unsuccessful in finding a strategic reconciliation between Beijing and Hong Kong people. 
Overall, the democratic movement theory argues that constitutional reforms in the 
election process are key to democracy, and that the inconsistencies in government 
behaviors on such issues are the major driving force behind the Umbrella Revolution.  
What can be said about the phenomenal success of this referendum is that Hong 
Kong people have legitimate concerns on the issues of political procedures and 
democratic progress. They genuinely believe that the true nature of political participation 	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demands people to step into the public sphere and engage in meaningful conversations 
that would help shape the future of a democratic society. A large majority would like to 
see all sectors of society engaging in a truly democratic and broadly representative 
election. The public has shown high interest, awareness, and knowledge about the current 
political situation.  
 
Ethnic Identity Theory 
The last major interpretation of the Umbrella Revolution is the ethnic identity 
theory. Not much research has been done in this area, but academics from the City 
University of Hong Kong and Hong Kong University have found that ethnic identity 
patterns in Hong Kong tend to follow the trends of political orientations. From empirical 
analysis, they found significant correlations between the two factors. I will contribute to 
this theory in the next two chapters by establishing the links between ethnic identity and 
political sentiments.  
When a popular movement like the Umbrella Revolution gains momentum, it is 
difficult for the public to actively distinguish between individual political orientations 
and societal wide identity shifts. And yet, inability to recognize the persistence of major 
identity shifts results in the attribution of responsibility of political inadequacy to 
systemic or institutional inefficiencies, which risks oversimplifying the intricate nexus 
woven into the relationship between politics and its people. Now, to say this is not to say 
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that institutional changes do not have an impact on individual identity, but that identity 
itself may shape people’s perceptions of politics.  
Historically speaking, the then-prevalent differences between the Hong Kong and 
Chinese were only addressed as differences between “the national” and “the local.”  In 
contemporary society, Hong Kong is a city where both Chinese nationalist culture and 
Western modern influences constantly come into conflict. As capitalistic drives motivate 
people to value individualism, freedom of opportunities, and tolerance for diversity, 
Sinocentrism in its traditional sense becomes alienated from society. Accordingly, the 
status of Sinocentric patriotism itself may be equated to ethnocentric dogma, resulting in 
a slightly slanted perception of the incentives behind mainland-style policies. Moreover, 
among cultural identities exist numerous dualities, grey areas, and in-betweens. The 
transfer of sovereignty may have left behind the transfer of minds. In fact, ethnic 
identities have vast implications on individual preferences, norms, standards, and 
political behaviors. The materialization of such identities can result in societal wide 
changes in the political climate.  
These conditions leave us to question how does ethnic identity feature in the 
deepening conflict-ridden processes of politicization and democratization of Hong Kong 
society? How does the public take part in the anxiety-provoking politics of China’s 
nation building? How did the different courses of cultural influx and political integration 
between the two regions leave their marks in the disposition of Hong Kong identity? I 
argue that the reality behind the Umbrella Revolution lies beyond the surface of civil 
disobedience, principles of the Basic Law, and the constitutional fight for democracy.  
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The ongoing democratic movement is led by an ideological wedge between surface and 
substance, appearance and reality. It is a political movement that is embedded in culture, 
one that constantly reflects and resonates back to the problem of identity. 
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Chapter 3 
Problem of Identity 
 
Introduction 
Let us rewind back to September 2014. According to majority of the mainstream 
media, protesters and activists at the Umbrella Revolution were ready to do whatever it 
takes to achieve universal suffrage. Spirited and determined, thousands of students linked 
their arms in solidarity during sit-in street protests. Many of them have vowed to face 
charges rather than resist arrest. Hand in hand, the Hong Kong Federation of Students and 
Occupy Central With Love and Peace discussed potential social-media strategies while 
organizing class boycott campaigns and business strikes. Within the next few days, the 
bustling metropolitan financial hub was turned into a miniature battlefield as police 
officers in riot gear started breaking up the human chains by rounds and rounds of tear 
gas and pepper spray. Protesters in turn defended themselves with yellow umbrellas, 
facemasks and rain ponchos while they returned and advanced courageously after each 
volley of tear gas. Although the protesters were able to fend off tear gas bombs with the 
aid of those fragile umbrellas, they were still unable to shield themselves from Beijing’s 
political control.  
On the surface of the Umbrella Revolution, the demonstrators have been 
galvanized by mainstream media as the knights of democracy, with a romanticized 
narrative of fighting against authoritarian control from Beijing’s leadership. The politics 
of the situation, however, extend beyond the popular story. From a neoclassical 
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Bismarckian perspective, China’s present strategy is one that “combines a subtle 
realpolitik effort at developing national capabilities and cultivating international partners” 
through economic and diplomatic engagements.24 By contrast, from a strategic culturalist 
perspective, recent analysis of Chinese foreign relations has shown signs of greater 
acceptance of multilateralism and international norms.25 Different narratives on the 
Umbrella Revolution itself have also attempted to interpret the ramifications behind 
democracy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, government position and democratic 
movement theory are distinguished voices on both sides of the argument. Yet, regardless 
of the viewpoint of these explanations of state behavior, it is impossible to deny the fact 
that Beijing’s leadership is simultaneously facing security issues on different fronts of its 
periphery, and their means to handle such popular dissent have been relatively consistent.  
Similar to the Hong Kong protests in 2014, civil unrests and riots have also 
occurred in Lhasa, Tibet in March 2008, and Ürümqi, Xinjiang in July 2009. Those who 
support Tibetan independence, such as Dalai Lama and Students for a Free Tibet, initially 
observed the nonviolent Tibetan Uprising Day. But when monks were arrested during 
peaceful demonstrations,26 the event unfortunately turned into a series of violent ethnic 
conflicts that have been ongoing until today. In the following year, a protest in Ürümqi 
involving around 1,000 Uyghurs quickly escalated into violent attacks that were targeted 
towards the Han people, leaving “at least 156 people dead and more than 800 people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Avery	  Goldstein,	  ‘An	  Emerging	  China’s	  Emerging	  Grand	  Strategy:	  A	  Neo-­‐Bismarckian	  Turn?’	  in	  John	  Ikenberry	  and	  Michael	  Mastanduno	  (eds),	  International	  Relations	  Theory	  And	  The	  Asia-­‐Pacific.	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University,	  2003),	  pp.	  60-­‐61.	  	  25	  Alastair	  Iain	  Johnston,	  ‘Socialization	  in	  International	  Institutions’,	  in	  John	  Ikenberry	  and	  Michael	  Mastanduno	  (eds),	  International	  Relations	  Theory	  And	  The	  Asia-­‐Pacific.	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University,	  2003),	  pp.	  107-­‐62. 26	  Oster,	  Shai	  (28	  March	  2008).	  "Lhasa	  Riots	  Expose	  Tibet's	  Split	  Society".	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal:	  
Business.	  Web.	  
	  	  
27	  
injured.”27 While security issues in Xinjiang and Tibet continue to remain delicate, the 
student led Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong not only won over the hearts and minds 
of the international community, but also once again shook the edifice of mandated 
hegemony in Chinese society.  
Although strategies for addressing security issues in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong 
Kong may differ due to distinctions in regime history and the extent of political control 
from Beijing, however, from the bloody riots that have roiled Tibet to the student tear gas 
fighters in Hong Kong, we can find one commonality amongst all three forms of civil 
unrests: Beijing’s nationalistic agenda of assimilation has “greatly strengthened the local 
identities, sharpened the sense of alienation and grievance felt by the targeted groups, and 
radicalized the activists among them.”28 The formation of a unique Hong Kong identity 
was catalyzed by political oppression and fueled by cultural assimilation. Evidently, 
Beijing’s political strategy of hastening the process of assimilation has unfolded 
numerous tensions and generated drawbacks in various dimensions. In the recent years, 
Beijing’s “mainlandization” strategy is mainly consisted of a combination of political and 
economic convergence, social integration, and draconian internal security measures, 
which mostly yielded counterproductive results from its peripheral regions.  
 This chapter explores the impacts of Beijing’s social, political, and economic 
integration of Hong Kong on the formation of political dissent and cultural identity. 
Research and surveys over the last few years have questioned the responsiveness of 
cultural identities to Beijing’s authoritarian control. The evidence that emerged from 	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these data, which will be further discussed in the following chapter, indicate that 
increased political tensions brought on by continued mainlandization in Hong Kong is 
positively correlated to a change in people’s cultural identities. Hence, if the political 
tensions generated by Beijing are one of the leading causes of the Umbrella Revolution, 
then a cultural identity shift may be the link between the two phenomena. This leads me 
to conclude as the formation of a Hong Kongese identity becomes more distinguishable, 
it is likely that popular dissent will expand while trends of political participation will 
become more democratic. 
 In this chapter, I will first discuss the various intersections between 
mainlandization policies, social stratification and the formation of a Hong Kongese 
identity. The mechanisms and processes of mainlandization combined with social 
stratification have sharpened identities and increased radicalization among local political 
forces. Next, the dynamics of identity becomes more complicated as I introduce the dual 
nature of Chineseness and the various grey areas that exist within cultural identities. By 
examining historical Chinese intellectual thought and contemporary patriotic ideology, I 
criticize the hypocrisy of realist mainlandization strategies of assimilation. Third, the 
literal and symbolic manifestations of identity come into light in the conversation on 
political participation. I argue that symbolic dimensions of cultural identities are 
necessary for producing counter-hegemonic forms of expression. The Hong Kongese 
identity is a symbol for solidarity and resistance, and therefore becomes key to our 
understanding of the ongoing democratic movements in society.  
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Mainlandization and Identity Formation 
1. Political Integration 
 The process of mainlandization has prevailed on different levels of society and 
demonstrated its success and weakness in three dimensions, namely, the political, social, 
and economic. First, the political situation of the city is one of the major concerns of 
Beijing’s leadership. Mainland-style policies, which include a series of efforts aimed at 
limiting the freedom of speech, press, and civil liberties, have been vigorously met with 
constant criticisms from the local and Western news. Prior to 1997, the degree of Hong 
Kong’s press freedom was one of the highest in Asia.29 Although the book publishing 
industry in Hong Kong operates under a separate legal system from the mainland, 
nowadays, its freedom of press has been increasingly threatened by Beijing’s censorship 
in silencing opposition and reshaping the media landscape in favor of China.  
In the recent efforts to assimilate Hong Kong into China, Beijing has been on the 
watch for any “treason, secession, sedition and subversion,” as a member of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Rocky Tse stated that “[writers’] 
harmful information will be harmoniously disappeared before you can even hit the send 
button.”30 There has been a “rapid jump in the number of violent attacks on members of 
the media, including 17 cases of assaults on journalists between June 2012 and June 
2014.”31 An even more obscure incident occurred when a total of five booksellers from 
Mighty Current Media Company Limited, specializing in banned books in China, 	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mysteriously vanished one after the other beginning in October 2015.32 Many speculate 
that the Chinese law enforcement agents may have illegally abducted these booksellers, 
further eroding the freedom of press and violating Hong Kong’s Basic law. While some 
major news sources have sided with pro-mainland voices, majority of Hong Kong people 
fear that Beijing’s persistent interferences may alter the city’s political climate. In fact, 
Beijing’s draconian political control of free speech and press, which attempted to impede 
the development of a democratic identity in Hong Kong, has not only resulted in 
significant reactionary backlash in the form of political dissent, but also in terms of 
cultural identity formation. 
 
2. Cultural Integration 
In the socio-cultural dimension of assimilation, Beijing has attempted to 
mainlandize Hong Kong’s youth through pedagogy of Chinese nationalism. In July 2012, 
thousands of Hong Kong protesters marched onto the streets to protest Beijing’s plan to 
introduce a Chinese patriotism curriculum to the Hong Kong education system. 
Consequently, not only was the blueprint of indoctrination unsuccessful, but a powerful 
pro-democracy student activist organization, Scholarism, also emerged to backfire on 
Beijing’s efforts. Led by the popular secondary school student activist Joshua Wong, the 
organization declared Beijing’s interference with Hong Kong’s educational policy 
unconstitutional. 33  According to Hong Kong’s public broadcasting station, RTHK, 
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approximately 90,000 activists and members of the public turned out at the event at 
Victoria Park, 34  and eventually forced Beijing’s leadership to withdraw from its 
introduction of the curriculum as a compulsory subject in schools. At a local conference 
concerning protests on the issue, educators met at the Holy Cross Church, where an 
associate professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Dixon Sing, 
mentioned, “We are sitting on a volcano. Beijing is trying to speed up the process of 
integrating Hong Kong in the cultural sense, ahead of elections when everyone gets to 
vote.”35 The new national curriculum is similar to the one taught in mainland China, 
which “[includes] a handbook titled ‘The China Model,’ [describing] the Communist 
Party as ‘progressive, selfless and united’ and criticize multiparty systems.”36 Critics of 
the curriculum have argued that it is an attempt to brainwash Hong Kong schoolchildren, 
and selectively teaches about historical and political events. Consequently, people in 
Hong Kong are beginning to dread the idea of Chinese nationalism due to the vast 
amount of political implications it unfolds while striving to uphold the core values of 
being Hong Kongese.  
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3. Social Integration 
The social dimension of integration has also produced numerous undesirable 
effects on the Hong Kong society, including the polarization of cultural identities. After 
almost two decades of reunification, the cultural distance between Hong Kong people and 
mainlanders have only exacerbated. Clashes occur periodically amongst the two groups, 
especially when mainland tourists do not follow the British-influenced social standards in 
Hong Kong. When traveling in Hong Kong, behaviors such as eating on the subway, 
talking loudly in public, or spitting and littering in the streets are often deemed as 
“uncivilized.” Although such behaviors are also not socially acceptable in the urban areas 
of China, they tend to be tolerated.  
Video clips of unwelcomed public behaviors are frequently uploaded onto the 
Internet, provoking public anger in Hong Kong. One of the viral videos contains footage 
of a toddler urinating publicly in Hong Kong’s streets. The parents of the child are 
mainland tourists who travelled to one of the most popular districts in Hong Kong – 
Mong Kok. An angry crowd quickly gathered as the parents try to defend their actions 
and “grab the memory card of someone in the crowd who had filmed the child.”37 The 
clip was widely circulated and spurred aggravating debates on both sides. However, it is 
important to note that the video does not simply reflect longstanding cultural differences 
between the two regions, but also reveals public anger toward an enormous influx of 
mainland tourists into the city on a daily basis.  
Unfortunately, some Hong Kongers have responded to these cultural differences 
with violent and barbaric actions, including the beating to death of a mainland tourist. In 	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October 2015, a 53-year-old mainland tourist tried to mediate a dispute at a local jewelry 
store, but was attacked by a group of four Hong Kong men and later passed away at the 
hospital.38 The fatal attack prompted Hong Kong authorities to safeguard the rights of 
mainland tourists. 
A derogatory term used by Hong Kongers to describe the mainland Chinese is 
“locusts,” a reference to tourists swarming into the city, taking its resources, and leaving 
a mess behind. While Hong Kong people called mainlanders “locusts,” Kong Qingdong, 
a social commentator and professor at Peking University, has also referred to Hong Kong 
people as “British running dogs.”39 Kong mentioned, “to the best of my knowledge, my 
people in Hong Kong don’t consider themselves to be Chinese. Those types of people are 
used to being the dogs of British imperialists – they are dogs, not humans.”40 His 
comments were broadcasted on Chinese television, which sparked yet another protest in 
the city.  
Besides the verbal denouncements from both sides, Hong Kong citizenship has 
also become a key issue in the social realm. Hong Kong has very limited resources for a 
small island. Geographically speaking, Hong Kong is “about a third the size of Rhode 
Island (USA's smallest state).”41 After the handover in 1997, more and more mainland 
mothers have been entering to Hong Kong to give birth, since children born in Hong 
Kong automatically receive not only permanent residency, but also better healthcare and 
education opportunities compared to China. On top of that, the Hong Kong passport 	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makes traveling easier for mainlanders. Many mainland families also would like to have 
children in Hong Kong in order to avoid the one-child policy (now parents who are the 
only child can have two children). The fines for this law go up exponentially as the 
number of children in the family increases.  In 2011, “nearly 4 in 10 births in Hong Kong 
… were to mainland parents,” despite the fact that “official quotas on maternity care” are 
put in place for nonresidents.42 In addition to benefits of birthright citizenship, mainland 
mothers often cross the border to purchase large quantities of baby milk powder. 
Although the government has set quotas on the number of milk power that can be brought 
into China, several areas of Hong Kong still face severe shortages in both hospital beds 
and milk power. 
Taken as a whole, the conflicts and disputes have generated a wedge in cultural 
identity in Hong Kong society. People with distinct cultural identities attempt to 
dissociate themselves from one another when seeing a behavior that they disapprove. In 
Hong Kong society today, a cultural stigma against mainlanders has emerged. There is 
stigma of being suspected of accepting mainlanders, stigma of identifying with 
mainlanders, stigma of suspected of being a mainlander, stigma of being a mainlander. It 
is important to note that, however, such attitudes are not applied to all members of 
society, but only to those who follow the favorable wind. 
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4. Economic Integration 
In the economic sector, Beijing introduced the Individual Visit Scheme in order to 
capitalize on tourism and boost Hong Kong’s economy when the city was hit by SARS in 
2003. The scheme was launched under the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 
(CEPA) and allowed mainland tourists from certain cities to visit Hong Kong on an 
individual basis. Initially, the scheme was only open to mainland residents from four 
Guangdong cities, but was soon expanded to 49 major cities (see Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Mainland cities under the Individual Visit Scheme 
Source: Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 
	  	  
36	  
As shown in the figure above, cities that were originally added to the scheme in 
2003 were mostly located in the Guangdong province (area shaded in grey). Residents in 
the Guangdong province tend to speak Cantonese, and come from relatively similar 
geographic and cultural backgrounds. However, in the consecutive years, residents from 
other parts of China were also granted access to visit Hong Kong. In Figure 3.1, inverse 
triangles colored in red, gold, blue and yellow represent cities that were added to the 
Individual Visit Scheme from years 2004 until 2007. Gradually but systematically, more 
and more people from northern parts of China were included. The differences in 
language, cuisine, cultural practices and physical traits were intensified when northerners 
entered the city. Majority of the conflicts that arose amongst tourists and locals revolve 
around these differences.  
According to the Hong Kong Tourism Commission, residents from these cities in 
China are now eligible to apply for an endorsement that is “valid for three months or one 
year and good for one or two visits to Hong Kong.”43 From 2002 to 2013, there has been 
a 33.8 percent increase in the share of mainland visitors in Hong Kong. By 2013, 75 
percent of all visitors were from the mainland. The scheme has generated profits for four 
major sectors in the economy: retail, servicing, transport, and tourism. Although 
Beijing’s strategy of economic integration appears to be immensely effective, taken 
together, the contributions of the scheme resulted in marginal economic growth. 
According to Government statistics, the scheme “amounted to HK$26.1 billion in value-­‐‑
added (1.3% of GDP) and 114 280 in the number of jobs” in 2012.44 While the job 
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creation process did prevent massive unemployment, the types of employment 
opportunities were mostly low-end, the value-added in overall GDP were minimal, and 
the contributions of the scheme towards long-term economic development were 
insignificant.  
While the Individual Visit Scheme has entailed some short-term economic 
benefits to the city, it has also raised major concerns over the impacts mainland tourism 
has made on the local community. Some of the major complaints of the scheme involve 
an overcrowding issue on the railway system and inflated rental prices. According to the 
Commerce and Economic Development Bureau, the MTR Corporation Limited 
“introduced more than 1200 additional train trips per week in 2012 to expand its carrying 
capacity by three million passenger trips,” while other train lines, such as the Tsuen Wan 
Line, Island Line and Kwun Tong Line, have already reached their maximum level of 
train trips.45  
In the recent months, the number of parallel traders in “areas of Hong Kong near 
the border with the mainland, such as Tuen Mun, Sheung Shui and Yuen Long” has 
driven up “the prices of goods and rents, pushing out small businesses serving locals.”46 
Hong Kong’s favorable exchange rates, non-existing taxes and tariffs, as well as lenient 
customs on the mainland border have made smuggling goods convenient to these traders. 
These parallel traders have taken advantage of the scheme and become professionals in 
importing goods from Hong Kong to the mainland. Besides, locals have complained that 
these traders create serious congestion on sidewalks and public transportations when 	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carrying large suitcases. As local communities and small businesses suffered, the 
Individual Visit Scheme has mainly generated wealth for Western luxury brands. Some 
believe that the social costs of the scheme have largely outweighed its marginal economic 
benefits. 
 
 
Stratification of Hong Kong Society 
As tensions swell, economic integration further aggravated the conflict of cultural 
identities. Undoubtedly, Hong Kong has generated much revenue from its economic 
collaboration with the rising Chinese state. Yet, not only do majority of the profits benefit 
the elites who cooperated with Beijing, but the ongoing democratic movement has also 
revealed a deep split in Hong Kong society between the grassroots and economic 
tycoons. Those at the top of the economic strata continue to benefit from a patronage 
system that values exclusiveness. In a sense, the elites in Hong Kong have carried out 
Beijing’s mission of economic integration at an institutional level, and many “have come 
to identify with Beijing’s priorities and interests more than those of the Hong Kong 
people.”47 Public opinion surveys and the local media have observed that, recently, there 
has been a trend of “resentment against the rich” in society.48 Thus, the enormous and 
visible rift indicates that the city has been increasingly “integrated on top, collapsed on 
the bottom.” A paradoxical result of the economic integration is that the closer China and 
Hong Kong are economically, the further apart they grow in terms of cultural identity.  	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Prior to the handover, the colonial administration accomplished an outstanding 
performance in the city’s economic development and social stability, which in many 
ways harnessed popular support from Hong Kong people. Similarly, Beijing has also 
gained considerable approval from mainland Chinese citizens by its phenomenal 
economic achievements in the recent decade. Among the many aspects that factor into the 
effectiveness of a government’s legitimacy over its constituents, a steady level of 
economic prosperity has often been able to quell political dissent. In the recent years, 
however, the social stratification of Hong Kong has formed into an ‘M-shape,’ with its 
society reaching two extremes: “the high-end wealthy businessmen and low-end service 
workers.”49 
With the Gini coefficient continuously rising, there has also been an increasing 
amount of statistics depicting the severe level of inequality in Hong Kong society. The 
United Nations Development Programme published a report indicating that “Hong 
Kong’s income gap was the largest among all Asian cities in 2008 and 2009” (Cheng, 
2014). In 2010, Oxfam Hong Kong reported that the number of poor-working families 
had swelled from “around 172,600 at the beginning of 2005 to about 192,500, a rise of 
12% in five and a half years.”50 The report also showed that as the poor-working class 
expanded, the incomes of these families had almost no improvement throughout the 
years. On the other hand, the median monthly incomes of the “richest one-tenth of 
families had increased by 16%... [which is] about 27 times that of the poorest one-tenth 
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of families.” 51  Moreover, when the global financial crisis hit in 2007, grievances 
expressed by the public toward the Hong Kong SAR government intensified. While 
housing-prices continue to skyrocket in the city, youngsters find it more and more 
difficult to have the purchasing power to own their own apartments in Hong Kong. 
Unfortunately, these legitimate sentiments were never met with adequate response from 
the government, leaving the public in an unsettled and insecure state.  	   Housing affordability is another major concern in Hong Kong society.	  When the 
numbers were crunched on the “12th Annual Demographia International Housing 
Affordability Survey” in 2016, Hong Kong was ranked at the top of the list for the least 
affordable housing among 87 major markets (See Table 2.1).52  As shown in Table 3.1, 
the higher the Median Multiple, the less affordable the housing market becomes in a 
metropolitan area. Hong Kong, with a Median Multiple of 19.0, is much less affordable 
than all of the other major cities around the world, such as Sydney (12.2), and Vancouver 
(10.8). In reality, what this number means is that “in Hong Kong, the median home costs 
19 times the median annual pre-tax household income, making it the highest multiple 
Demographia has measured in 12 years of conducting the survey.”53 Similarly, from 
Figure 3.2 on housing affordability from 2004-2015, it is clear to see that not only is 
Hong Kong ranked much higher than the others, the slope of its housing unaffordability 
(in solid green) is also getting steeper from 2010 to 2014. In terms of ranking, Hong 
Kong leaped from number 17 in 2015 to the top in 2016. Taken together, while the city 
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has been notorious for it’s over priced real estate market for over a decade, the recent 
jump in housing prices is still unexplained for.  
Interestingly, a counterintuitive fact about the real estate market in Hong Kong is 
that it has an unusually “high proportion (almost half) of all private housing…owned 
without a mortgage,” which indicates “sufficient wealth in the community to enable 
property to be purchased without bank financing.”54 In light of this phenomenon, a 
popular argument explaining this is that Chinese buyers are flooding the real estate 
market and crowding out local buyers. Regardless of the truth behind this statement, the 
perception of the phenomenon may become materialized, shaping people’s perceptions 
toward the mainland Chinese. They believe that Hong Kong’s housing market no longer 
serves those who view housing as a necessity, but has become a luxurious investment for 
the rich. As a result, the housing bubble has generated much panic in society since 
property prices have become extremely susceptible to public sentiments.  
Meanwhile, public housing is often not an option for the younger generation in 
the middle to lower economic strata either. The Housing Authority in Hong Kong reports 
that the average waiting time for general applicants for public rental housing is 3.7 years, 
while elderly people have an average waiting time of 2.1 years.55 Younger single 
applicants, on the other hand, are “subject to a limited quota of homes, allocated 
according to a points system. No details of their average waiting time were revealed.”56 In 
addition, youngsters will also be forced to share the compact living space with older 	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generations of the family, possibly even after marriage, which often leads to 
overcrowding. As living conditions continue to look gloom, current financial struggles 
and concerns for future development would certainly generate forms of political dissent 
amongst the youth population.  
Ironically, Beijing’s rhetoric on the Umbrella Revolution, its processes of 
mainlandization, combined with social stratification in Hong Kong have provided the 
groundwork for a reactionary backlash in terms of cultural identity. Politically, as 
Beijing’s leadership denounce the democratic movement as an act of rebellion and civil 
disobedience, Hong Kong citizens are standing up against an authority that oversteps its 
powers, violates its promises of “One Country, Two Systems,” and monopolizing the 
city's political artery. Simultaneously, in the economic realm, while interests groups and 
political parties seek a larger share of the pie, severe institutional problems in Hong Kong 
become clear: inefficiencies in the market economy are generated by unfair rules and 
non-transparency. The power relations embedded in the political dynamics of a stratified 
society produce marginalized groups that desperately demand to be heard. We come to 
find out that grassroots and youngsters easily become the victims of this system. We 
realize that the political system is no longer representative of the voices of these people. 
Consequently, distinct cultural identities are also most prominent among these groups.  
And yet, the current problems in Hong Kong are far more complicated than the 
inefficiencies generated by the neo-classical economic model. It is crucial to refrain from 
a linear analysis of structural imbalance of power, leap between the ideological and 
concrete, and incorporate the realm of cultural politics into the equation. The new wave 
of pro-democratic movements is a product of the nexus of forces behind mainlandization: 
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the frequent ideological clashes between the rich and poor, the government and its 
constitutions, as well as the premature encounters of distinct cultural groups, as “close 
contact breeds not amity, but animosity, mutual disrespect and a stronger self-
awareness.”57 In a highly materialistic society, it is rare to see such a remarkable and 
distinct non-materialistic orientation in its political dissent. Participants of the Umbrella 
Revolution receive spiritual fulfillment from the campaign process, as their democratic 
ideologies are held at the highest regard throughout the movement. These spiritual 
gratifications generated by the process of democratic movements are, in turn, directly 
correlated to the principles of being Hong Kongese. Young participants in the movement 
are an enormous encouragement to society at large, as they are ready to take on the 
responsibilities of protecting the interests of the community. It is clear to see that in a 
society that is being torn apart, the democratic movement is one that upholds the core 
values of the Hong Kongese identity.  
When it comes to identity issues in Hong Kong, people do not tend to think about 
the fact that there is a Hong Kongese identity, a Chinese identity, and many other forms 
of identities that lie in-between the two. What about those who realize that sovereignty do 
not necessarily produce a sense of belonging? How do they feel? Where do they go? 
What these identities mean to each individual has large implications on how they 
perceive their own relationship to the existing political system. It can be argued that 
social stratification of Hong Kong society has produced new identities, youth and 
grassroots in particular, that requires serious investigation. By moving beyond the narrow 
limitations of the victim-oppressor relationship, the study on cultural identity and its 	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relative subgroups enables us to create a more meaningful dialogue on the realities of 
being Hong Kongese. We must not simply analyze the ramifications of social 
stratification, but also the cultural implications of such consequences.  
 
Table 3.1 
 
Figure 3.2                                                   
 
Source: Demographia, “12th Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey” 
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Nationalism and Localism: Cultural Duality of Chineseness 
Recent studies on the relationship between hegemonic power and the notion of 
Chineseness present to us an intricate picture on cultural imperialism and the network of 
power relations. An alternative approach to the question of identity demands us to “depart 
from the narrow ‘ethnic’ conception of Chineseness, [and emphasize] the continuous 
process of how Chinese identity [can be] constantly disembedded and reintegrated.”58 
The fusion between “British colonialism and chauvinistic Chinese nationalism” may have 
produced “plural forms” of Chineseness in post-colonial politics.59 In contemporary Hong 
Kong society, resistance against hegemonic Chinese culture has been steadily growing, 
while a distinct identity for the Hong Kong people has gradually emerged. An 
understanding of the development of a Hong Kongese identity requires us to not only 
dismantle “how Chinese identity has been received, perceived, and experienced,”60 but 
also pay close attention to the sensitive contextual complexities tied to its local history, 
national issues, and global concerns. Is the Hong Kongese identity a form of counter-
hegemonic expression? Or does it contain a completely different set of values, norms and 
standards from the Chinese identity? 
Prior to the transfer of sovereignty, in traditional Chinese nationalist culture, 
scholars often referred to Hong Kong as a “cultural desert” that lacks the capacity to 
produce real intellectual thought. They believed that the “colonial atmosphere and 
conservatism” leaves Hong Kong nothing more than “a filthy corner of an unreclaimed 
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Chinese territory that could give rise only to misgivings or bad feelings.”61 Hong Kong 
was seen as a desolated island marked with cultural decadence and intellectual 
backwardness. Anti-imperialistic narratives severely hindered the growth of Hong Kong 
culture, as they tarnished Hong Kong’s image and diminished the significance of colonial 
culture.  
Yet, according to these mainland critics, the most revolting characteristics of 
Hong Kong people lies in their “sexual and moral unpredictability, which was seen as 
responsible for the ethnic hybridity exemplified by the many cases of miscegenation 
there.”62 In colonial Hong Kong, many students spoke fluent English and studied from 
western-style education; they ate western meals and fell in love with western men. Critics 
believed that colonization of land corresponded to colonization of mind, and speculated 
that people who were born and raised in Hong Kong must have lost their Chinese 
nationality, their Chinese soul. Hence, their perception of “women’s loss of chastity [was 
that] colonization [led to] Hong Kong’s moral decay,” 63 and ethnic hybridity generated 
cultural infertility and intellectual barrenness. 
 Apart from the arrogant dogma behind this narrative, it was evident that Hong 
Kong was becoming the “Chinese nationalists’ internal other – backward, vulgar, and 
colonized.”64 Political conversations on Hong Kong and the mainland required no efforts 
to be further explored or understood. It is equally frightening and dangerous since moral 
and cultural decadence of the colonized was assumed to be self-evident and logical. But 	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this does not mean that there is no envy behind this narrative, since the phenomenon can 
almost be described as reverse discrimination. In the dialectical discourse between 
“capitalistic paradise” and “cultural barrenness,” the nationalistic logic left its marks in 
the configuration of the Hong Kongese identity.  
Moreover, cultural antagonism from mainland scholars also reveals a 
“transformation of status, through a perverse logic of identification with the colonizer, 
from that of victim to that of dominant cultural power – a transformation that has been 
integral to the formation of contemporary Chinese nationalism.”65 The psychological 
satisfaction generated from this perverse logic, however, is almost just as vulgar and 
abhorrent as colonization itself. Ideological dissociation of Hong Kong from the 
mainland “borrowed a tourist-like gaze from the West,” and effectively “rationalized the 
legitimacy of an Orientalist exoticism, which framed the Chinese nationalist’s gaze on its 
internal other.”66 Being the cultural Other, regardless of its political conformity or 
transfer of sovereignty, Hong Kong would never be able to reach the same level of 
playing field as other major mainland cities. Gradually, the views of mainland scholars 
on Hong Kong materialized into deep-rooted beliefs in contemporary patriotic ideology.  
In the recent comments by Kong Qingdong, a professor at Peking University, he 
used “bastards,” “thieves” and “dogs of British imperialists” to describe the people of 
Hong Kong.67 Later in a blog post, Kong wrote “I know there are many nice people in 
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Hong Kong, but many Hong Kong people are still dogs.”68 Of course, Kong uses “dogs” 
metaphorically, indicating that Hong Kong people are still living under a colonial 
mentality and do not to produce their own culture. However, by imposing negative 
stereotypes that lump all members of society together, Kong also fails to see Hong Kong 
people as individual beings. We can see a continuation of nationalistic perspectives in 
contemporary Chinese intellectual thought. The perception of Hong Kong being a 
“foreign country” in China becomes evident.  
The hypocrisy of this particular nationalistic narrative greatly hinders the 
democratic interests of Hong Kong society and infringes on the possibilities of a Hong 
Kongese identity. While the Central Government stresses on the importance of social, 
economic, and political assimilation of Hong Kong to the mainland for the betterment of 
the nation as a whole, cultural identity divergence and ideological rifts only seem to 
exacerbate under the nationalistic logic. Hong Kong cannot be both assimilated and the 
Other at the same time. Under this narrative, Hong Kong people cast doubts on the 
genuineness of mainlandization policies and speculate that realist interests that may have 
sprung behind it. Hence, desire for a distinct Hong Kongese identity becomes 
understandable, as it signifies a refusal to be stereotyped and provides a possibility for 
counter-hegemonic expression.  
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Reinventing Hong Kong Identity 
Most past research attempting to unfold the culture and society of Hong Kong 
have professed a sense of fascination over its laissez-faire prosperity, political 
peculiarities in post-colonialist society, and the exoticness of a hybrid form of Hong 
Kong culture. The liberal-modernist narratives on the growth of Hong Kong are not only 
“highly sympathetic to colonial rule,” often portraying it as a “barren-rock-turned-
capitalist paradise,” but also tend to reveal a glamorized version of the city’s history and 
culture, describing it as a “natural arena where both Western and Eastern cultures could 
intermingle.”69 By contrast, the Chinese nationalistic perspective superficially selects 
“anti-British and pro-China assertions … of colonial history,”70 while pushing for a 
political agenda that prioritizes “One Country” before “Two Systems.” Despite the 
polarization of views on Hong Kong’s historiography, intellectual thought concerning the 
region has generally emphasized a hackneyed linear power dynamic of colonialism and 
power, with its propensity to convey a mere political analysis or social commentary on 
Hong Kong’s transition of sovereignty. The political transformations Hong Kong society 
has undergone confine our attention to the larger picture: it characterizes hegemonic 
power as an instrument for legitimizing domination of the rulers over its constituents. 
However, the traditional definition of hegemonic power is no longer appropriate in 
examining the multiplicity of Hong Kong’s network of power relations and the 
impersonal forces of cultural imperialism. 
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The notion of Hong Kongese encompasses both literal and symbolic 
manifestations. Narrowly construed, the Hong Kongese identity refers to those who carry 
Hong Kong citizenship with a sense of belongingness to Hong Kong. Broadly speaking, 
it refers to a conceptual and symbolic way of organizing values, norms, and standards so 
that they are unique to a society. The difficulty in comprehending cultural identity arises 
from the failure to distinguish between three perspectives: the personal, social, and 
political. Moreover, interactions between the three perspectives on identity may also 
reveal how hegemony of a certain identity may reproduce and solidify cultural and 
political forms of domination. Hegemony of identity indicates the possibility of cultural 
imperialism and forms of systematic oppression within a society. The power formation in 
Hong Kong can be constituted by pre-existing forms legitimate domination that trickles 
down to every single layer of society, including individual preferences and societal 
norms. 
In the case of a political uprising in the name of democracy, personal and social 
identities heavily influence people’s preferences and decisions on their political system 
and its respective forms of representation. Since the early 1980s, Hong Kong’s political 
culture has been gradually cultivating “civic awareness and the corresponding quest for a 
political community.”71 Although the Chinese government has initially allowed for 
people’s self-identification, the issue becomes more complicated when “the process of 
decolonization meets with the process of democratization, as the latter is conducive to the 
development of an indigenous political community.”72 Thus, the development of a 
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political force is a product of growth in cultural identity, and that political actions are the 
outcome of such movements.  
For instance, the bloody repression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 has 
always lingered in Hong Kong people’s memories. On June 4, 1989, the popular student-
led demonstration was cracked down with assault rifles and military tanks in the heart of 
Beijing. Eight years prior to the handover, Hong Kong has already started to lose 
confidence in the mainland government. The repression of democracy in 1989 has also 
“entailed an ongoing population exodus from Hong Kong throughout the 1990s and 
paved the way to the protest movements of 2003.”73 The political movements in Hong 
Kong represent people’s striving efforts to preserve a unique Hong Kong heritage, its 
collective memory, and political consciousness. Hence, there is an urgent need to review 
and evaluate the value of Hong Kongese identity and the perceived notions of power and 
privilege attached to it.   
Although the literal component of cultural identity contains heuristic usefulness, it 
is necessary to focus on the broader dimension of symbolic identity. Theoretically, 
collective symbolic identity allows us to incorporate other variables embedded in the 
notion of Hong Kongese, such as age, race, gender, sexual-orientation, socioeconomic 
class, education level, etc. These variables will be statistically examined in the following 
chapter. The symbolic value of cultural identity can unveil the multiplicity of interactive 
forces and power structures within a society with or without the presence of a discernable 
ruler. The literal component, on the contrary, pinpoints social and political oppression 
from a linear power dynamic, and associates it directly to the ruler itself. There is no 	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doubt that the transition of sovereignty in Hong Kong has shifted the literal component of 
identity, but the ideological and symbolic manifestations of postcolonial identity 
formation are equally as significant, since they provide us with a new framework to grasp 
the undercurrents of Hong Kong society under political transformation. 
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Chapter 4 
The Rise of Youth Political Participation 
 
Introduction 
Since the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997, the Chinese government 
and other pro-mainland voices had high hopes of gradually merging the two regions 
together in terms of cultural identity, especially among the youth population. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Beijing has slowly but systematically developed a 
model of assimilation, which consists of various mechanisms under the processes of 
mainlandization, in order to solve the “problem” of Hong Kong’s cultural defiance.  
In the 1980s, the leader of China, Deng Xiaoping, formulated “One Country, Two 
Systems” to reach peaceful reunification, and allow regions such as Hong Kong and 
Macau to retain their own legal, political and economic systems for 50 years, even under 
the control of socialist China. The principle was also designed under the rationale that 
once the colonial system has left the region and “ceased poisoning young minds, ... future 
generations would embrace the worldview and politics favored in Beijing.” 74  The 
departure of such practices, however, did not take place with the consent of Hong Kong 
people.  
Years after the transition of sovereignty, the policies of mainlandization have only 
intensified the growth of a distinct cultural identity, especially among younger and more 	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educated generations in post-colonial Hong Kong society. Since the 1980s, youth 
uprisings have been tied to civilized mass street protests that are organized by students. 
There has been an honorable cultural tradition of valuing youth intellectual thought and 
political fervor. The rise of youth populations as a political force has been increasingly 
prominent in the recent years. Typical examples include “the Star Ferry Pier [protests] in 
2007, … the anti-high-speed-rail campaign and the by-elections in 2010.”75  
Over the last few years, the youth population in Hong Kong has gradually become 
a strong new participant in the political arena. The social attitudes, value orientations, and 
political participation among the youth group have exhibited distinct behavioral patterns 
when compared to those of the older generations. They advocate for their vision of Hong 
Kong core values, “with emphasis on social justice, poverty alleviation and 
democracy.”76 Their objectives are aimed at targeting structural problems existing in the 
government and society, including issues related to the widening wealth gap, rising 
property prices, environmental conservation, heritage preservation, government 
credibility, business collusions, lack of social mobility, and a stagnant democratic 
development in the city. On the contrary, for older generations, the connection between 
democracy and revolution has made many people nervous. Many believe that if they 
associate themselves with the movement, they will be associated with civil disobedience, 
rebellion, and chaos. For some, this is a frightening thought. Thus, the polarization of 
political dissent has been occurring across different age groups. In order to grasp the full 
extent of the complexities embedded in the nature and dynamics of such mass rallies, we 
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must also dismantle the network of power relations and interpersonal forces that are at 
work at Hong Kong’s political crisis.  
Thus far, we have established the theme of identifying symbolic cultural identity 
as one of the major factors contributing to political dissent. This chapter focuses on data 
analysis of public opinion and political development of youth populations in Hong Kong. 
Recent studies on the public opinion of the Umbrella Revolution have indicated a 
polarization of political views in Hong Kong society amongst different age groups and 
education levels. Younger populations and those who received higher levels of education 
tend to be more democratic. This chapter will examine statistics of those who were born 
between 1975 and 1999. As of the year 2014, those aged 15 to 39 will be included in the 
study. Other factors, such as socioeconomic status, employment opportunities, social 
mobility, and political trust also come into light when discussing about the political 
orientations of different subgroups in society. An empirical analysis on social attitudes, 
political orientations, and identity of these respondents indicate that younger generations 
have the highest tendency to identify as Hong Kongese, distrust the Central Government, 
and support unconventional forms of political participation. 
It is important to note that symbolic cultural identity encompasses a variety of 
different perceptions from its respective subgroups, and that a divergence from this 
identity may produce new forms of power dynamics. As political tensions soar in the 
midst of mainlandization, cultural identity shifts become an increasingly crucial factor in 
determining the level of dissent. These shifts reveal significant implications of Chinese 
hegemony on Hong Kong society, as political oppression may occur with or without a 
discernable ruler. Moreover, public discourse in the form of street protests has become 
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synonymous with political participation of the youth. There is an immediate linkage 
between youth identity and more radical forms of political movements in Hong Kong 
society. In this chapter, I will empirically demonstrate a strong positive correlation 
between the youth identity and the Hong Kongese identity, which in turn gave rise to the 
Umbrella Revolution. This chapter first defines the youth population in Hong Kong in 
terms of its literal and symbolic meanings. Second, the formation of youth identity will 
be explored, unfolding its implied definitions and relation to political dissent. Lastly, 
discussions on the rise of youth as political force will be centered on three main areas: 
economic perceptions, political attitudes, and civic awareness.  
 
 
Defining the Youth Population 
 The term “youth” can be broadly understood as a category of people transitioning 
from childhood to adulthood. The “Post-80s” and “Post-90s” are popular terms 
describing the younger generations in Hong Kong. They are used to categorize those who 
were born in or after 1980 or 1990. Youngsters who were born in these time periods have 
distinctive experiences growing up in a society that has undergone tremendous economic 
and political transformations. Circumstances for older and younger generations in Hong 
Kong have been different. Older generations possessed a sense of superiority living under 
the colonial regime due to economic prosperity, whereas younger generations, some 
argue, have developed an “inferiority complex” as a result of the economic slump.77 	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Thus, the public conversations of these younger generations also derive from new forms 
of liberation, education, and social status, which in numerous ways have catalyzed the 
formation of a distinctive Hong Kongese identity among the youth.  
 The relationship between the youth and politics is complex. In a refined sense, 
younger generations in Hong Kong have the tendency to “doubt the rationale of the 
existing institutional design, [and are often] described as activists by the local media.”78 
Not only do the youth have relatively negative opinions on democratic progress, they also 
are extremely unsatisfied with the political structure, unconfident in political trust, and 
pessimistic about Hong Kong’s future economic development. They actively demand the 
government to address and tackle issues “such as rising property prices, the gap between 
rich and poor, cultural heritage and the road map of democracy development.”79 Hence, 
social issues are an immediate concern for younger generations that are about to face the 
real world plagued with troubling economic and political conditions. Youth political 
engagement in the public sphere becomes key to democratic principles, as it creates a 
platform for addressing political dissent.  
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Youth Identity Formation 
1. National Identity and Public Sentiments 
 General trends in Hong Kong society have indicated a growing ideological gap 
between the old and young, widening wealth gap between the rich and poor, and eroding 
trust between people and the government. The growth of democratization around the 
globe has also been hastened by the development of information technology, in 
particular, the Internet. Advancements of communication patterns, information spread, 
and media culture have substantially impacted on the ways in which younger generations 
perceive the world. The shifts in ideological landscape for Hong Kong youth “gravely 
concerns” Beijing, for that they believe it suggests a lack of national identity. At a local 
deputies meeting in Shenzhen, a Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress, 
Michael Tien Puk-sun, mentioned “the reason why they see a problem is that polls have 
found that more people identified themselves as Hongkongers instead of Chinese. Some 
have even waved the old Hong Kong flag, and there was strong opposition to the 
introduction of national education.”80 In fact, according to the Categorical Ethnic Identity 
poll conducted by Hong Kong University since 1997, on top of the widening ideological 
and wealth gaps, the ethnic identities for Hong Kong people have been polarizing as well. 
 The Categorical Ethnic Identity survey is conducted by telephone interviews for 
Cantonese speakers in Hong Kong aged 18 or above, with a sample size of more than 500 
each time. They survey broadly categorizes ethnic identity into five groups: Hong Kong 
Citizen, Chinese Citizen, Hong Kong Chinese Citizen, Chinese Hong Kong Citizen, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Lee,	  Colleen,	  and	  Gary	  Cheung.	  "Beijing	  Concerned	  about	  National	  Identity	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  Youth."	  
South	  China	  Morning	  Post.	  15	  Jan.	  2013.	  Web.	  	  	  
	  	  
59	  
Others. Respondents may identify with only one of the choices according to their own 
interpretation of the term. Figure 4.1 indicates the trends of all five categories of ethnic 
identity, with light green as Hongkonger, red as Hongkonger in China, navy blue as 
Chinese in Hong Kong, dark blue as Chinese, and purple as Mixed Identity. Leaving the 
category of Mixed Identity aside, there has been a significant jump in the light green line 
for Hongkonger since 2008, and a dramatic decrease of the Chinese identity starting from 
2007. The other two lines, Hongkonger in China and Chinese in Hong Kong have shown 
relatively modest changes. However, the category of Hongkonger in China has been 
historically above the Chinese in Hong Kong. 
 Similarly, Figure 4.2 demonstrates the polarization of categorical identity issues 
in a clearer fashion. The dark red line is a combination of two ethnic identities that are 
closer to the Hong Kong identity, namely, the Hongkonger and Hongkonger in China 
identities. The dark green line, on the contrary, represents two identities that are closer to 
Chinese identity, which includes Chinese and Chinese in Hong Kong. The dark red line 
places an emphasis on Hong Kong, whereas the dark green line focuses on the Chinese 
identity. While the identities Hongkonger and Chinese may seem clear, the other two 
may appear vague and obscure. In broad terms, the category Chinese in Hong Kong 
indicates that one identifies as a Chinese person residing in Hong Kong. The category 
Hongkonger in China, suggests that while Hong Kong belongs to China, the identity of 
Hong Kongese is different from that of the Chinese.  
From Figure 4.2, beginning in 2008, there has been a drastic separation between 
the dark red and dark green lines, revealing a major shift in people’s perception of what it 
means to be Hong Kongese or Chinese. An increasing number of people have chosen to 
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identify with Hong Kongese identities instead of Chinese. From 2003 to 2007, the ethnic 
identities of people in Hong Kong were relatively less divergent. The split between Hong 
Kongese and Chinese identities were approximately at a 50/50 ratio. Yet, in year 2015, 
the Hong Kong identities have gained about 70 percent of recognition, while Chinese 
identities fell to 30 percent. What drastically altered people’s perception of the Chinese 
identity, which allowed for the Hong Kong identity to gain steam in the following years? 
What are the factors that continuously shape and favor a Hong Kongese identity in 
society?  
First of all, identity shifts can occur as a result of major political or economic 
transformations. Local or national policy implementations, economic agreements, or even 
significant events such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics may alter people’s perception of 
identity. Second, globalization and technological advancements in the Internet has also 
made people more connected than any point in history. There has been exponential 
growth in cyber-communities, leading to the interconnectedness of political and social 
conversations on a global scale. Third, while a wide variety of factors may contribute to 
identity shifts, there may also be a lag in response in people’s perceptions to their 
environmental transformations.  Therefore, identity shifts may not directly correspond to 
a single event, but rather to a series of gradual changes overtime.  
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Figure 4.1 
 
Figure 4.2 
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In this paper, I will only consider the general trends overtime in identity shifts, 
since it is relatively difficult to pinpoint distinct causes of a sudden identity shift in a 
given year without an econometric regression model. Thus, structural changes in the 
political and economic arena in year 2008, in particular, would require a different 
analysis. In order to answer the questions addressed above, we must trace back to the 
connections between identity and public sentiments.  
The Public Sentiments Index (PSI) in Figure 4.4 is another key survey conducted 
by Hong Kong University in an attempt to measure the possibility of collective behaviors 
in society. There are two major components to the PSI index: the Government Appraisal 
(GA) score and the Society Appraisal (SA) score. Scores are collected from various 
opinion surveys and calculated on a scale ranging from 0 to 200, with 100 being the 
normal score. The higher the score, the more satisfaction and appraisal there is toward the 
government and society. If we take a look at Figure 4.4 on the index of Public Sentiments 
in Hong Kong, it is fairly easy to identify the general patterns for all three indexes on the 
graph. As shown in the graph, three major trends have occurred in terms of public 
sentiments. The slope of PSI is negative between 1997 and 2001, positive from 2002 to 
2007, and negative from 2008 until 2015.  
Now, let us compare these trends to the Categorical Ethnic Identity data in Figure 
4.3. The two identities included in this figure are Hongkonger (light green line) and 
Chinese (dark blue line). Interestingly, the patterns of this graph are strikingly similar to 
those of the public sentiments figure. From 1997 to 2001, the Hongkonger identity is 
above the Chinese one, indicating a strong popularity for people identifying with Hong 
Kong. From 2002 until 2007, the pattern becomes reversed, as the Chinese identity rises 
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above the Hongkonger identity. After a significant identity shift in 2008, the Hongkonger 
identity picks up its momentum again and rises above the Chinese identity from 2008 to 
2015. In short, the trends reveal a strong indication that there is a positive correlation 
between the Chinese identity and public sentiments, and vise versa for the Hongkonger 
identity (see Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1  - Identity and Public Sentiments 
 PSI Chinese identity Hongkonger identity 
1997 – 2001 Negative (-) Negative (-) Positive (+) 
2002 – 2007 Positive (+) Positive (+) Negative (-) 
2008 - 2015 Negative (-) Negative (-) Positive (+) 
 
 The comparison of identity and public sentiments observes the political arena of 
Hong Kong in its broadest sense. Public sentiments as a result of political or economic 
transformations, such as mainlandization, directly affect not only individuals, but also 
groups in society. Collective identity shifts tend to go hand in hand with public 
sentiments, as they represent a plethora of stakeholders, organizations, and interest 
groups in society. Moreover, Figure 4.3 measures the two most “extreme” categories of 
identity, namely, the Hongkonger and Chinese. These two identities differ from the 
others in that their literal definitions exclusively imply complete identification with either 
Hong Kong or China, not both. Similar to the mechanisms behind democratic elections, 
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moderates tend to identify less with popular sentiments, but the views of those at the two 
ends of the political spectrum almost become synonymous to political dissent. Taken as a 
whole, Beijing’s concerns for a lack of national identity becomes legitimate, since the 
implications of a Hong Kongese identity may extend beyond cultural and ethnic 
connotations: an underlying political and social transformation in Hong Kong society is 
gradually underway.  
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Figure 4.3 
 
Figure 4.4 
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2. Demographics of the Hong Kongese Identity and Political Trust 
  
 An understanding of the demographics of the Hong Kongese identity will 
significantly contribute to establishing the connections between popular sentiments and 
identity. According to a study on the “Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong 
Kong: A Follow-up Study,” conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 
March 2015, “an overwhelming majority of the two younger cohorts (15-19, and 20-29) 
identify themselves as Hong Kongers, both over 80%, in contrast to 10% being 
Chinese.”81 The older generation of respondents (30-39) has a 63% rate of identifying 
with Hong Kong, and 21% of being Chinese (See Figure 4.5 and Table 4.2).  
 Figure 4.5 shows the relationship between age, identity and political trust. The 
2,000 respondents of the survey are divided into three age groups: 15-19, 20-29, and 30-
39, as of year 2014. The blue bar corresponds to the youngest age group (15-19), with the 
red bar representing the second youngest (20-29) and green bar representing the oldest 
generation (30-39). Three indexes are measured on the horizontal axis: (A) Identity, (B) 
Trust in HK SAR Government, and (C) Trust in Central Government.  
If we take a look at Table 4.2, each of these indexes is further divided into 
different categories. For example, the Identity index includes the “Chinese,” “Hong 
Kong,” and “both or both not.” Whereas the options for Trust in HKSAR Government or 
the Central Government include “Trust/Trust Strongly” and “”Do not trust/Do not trust 
strongly.” In order to simplify the case, I only use the Hong Kong identity for (A), and 	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“Do not trust/Do not trust strongly” for (B) and (C) in Figure 4.5. In Figure 4.5, the 
vertical axis measures the percentage of the population within each age group identifying 
with the above indexes. As shown in the graph, the Post-80s and Post-90s (15-19 and 20-
29) have the highest tendency to identify as Hong Kongese and not trust the Central 
Government. The middle age group (20-29) indicates a much higher level of distrust 
(more than 10% difference) towards the HK SAR Government compared to the other two 
groups. Overall, it can be observed that the middle youth group (20-29) has the highest 
level of distrust for both governments, and the highest identification level (80.7%) toward 
the Hong Kong identity.  
In a society where younger generations have demonstrated high levels of distrust 
toward the government, political dissent is more likely to prevail. From the fragile 
economic conditions to the escalating authoritarianism under mainlandization, youth 
political dissents materialize, legitimize, and actualize. Regardless of the ideological 
polarization between the old and young generations, the major problem is that newly 
emerging social conditions directly impact the younger generation in the form of sheer 
economic force and naked political power. We must, therefore, recognize the rise of the 
youth identity as a principle political power in Hong Kong society.  
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Figure 4.5 - Identity and Political Trust 
 
Notes: (A) refers to Hong Kong Identity, (B) refers to Trust in HKSAR Government, and (C) refers to Trust in Central 
Government. 
 
Table 4.2 - Identity and Political Trust 
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Rise of the Youth as Political Force 
 
 There are three main reasons for the youth to rise as a major political force in 
Hong Kong. On an individual level, worsening economic conditions have made them 
sensitive to the gradual decrease in occupational mobility.82 Collectively, the expansion 
of higher-level education and global Internet use have not only advanced their means to 
acquire public information, heightened their response to social issues and political 
interests, but also aroused a sense of civil awareness amongst the youth population in 
society.  
 In terms of economic conditions, research on social mobility generally measures 
the ability for a group of people to move from one economic sector to another in society. 
More narrowly construed, differences between intergenerational and intra-generational 
occupational mobility also exist. Intergenerational mobility is a measure of social 
openness, while the latter concerns about the possibility of changing jobs after one’s first 
job.83 On the other hand, upward mobility is defined as the movement from an occupation 
in the lower economic strata a higher one, and vice versa for downward mobility. In 
Table 4.3, we can see that the Post-80s generation (1980-1989) has the highest level of 
intra-generational immobility and inter-generational upward mobility. The data indicates 
that younger generations may find it difficult to move to a higher paying job even with a 
high degree of social openness.  
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Table 4.3 – Trends in Occupational Mobility in Hong Kong 
 
Source: HKUST (2010), “HK’s Post 80s Generation: Profile and Predicaments,” P.28. 
 
 Perceptions for future economic development also fundamentally shape youth 
political dissent. According to Table 4.4, the fresh-out-of-college generation (ages 20-29) 
has the most pessimistic views on the opportunities for future personal development in 
Hong Kong. Majority (51.2%) of young people in this generation believe that future 
personal development will be “worse than now.”  Overall, a large percentage (49.4%) of 
all age groups believe that future opportunities for personal development will become 
worse.  
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Table 4.4 - Compared to the present situation, will opportunities for personal 
development in Hong Kong become better or worse in the future? 
  
Source: CUHK (2015), “Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong: A Follow-Up Study,” P.13 
 
 On a collective level, the expansion of higher-level education in the 1990s 
heightened political participation among youth groups. As tertiary educational 
opportunities increased, Hong Kong gradually transformed into a knowledge-based 
economy, and younger generations became beneficiaries of the system.84 “New values 
and ideas” were infused into society, for example, “individualism, human rights and 
democracy, social justice and environmental protection.”85 The reality of Hong Kong 
society, however, is far from these ideals. Youth unemployment soared over the past 
decade due to a lack of structural expansion in the labor market to absorb new workers.86 
Thus, when future expectations fail to materialize, pessimistic attitudes and political 
dissent may result in more unconventional forms of political participation.  	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 Starting from the 1990s, the expansion of higher-level education has also been 
complemented with an expansion of the Internet. The spread of new technologies and 
free information has allowed “e-mobilization” to surpass conventional forms of collective 
political behavior, encouraged the concepts of human rights, free speech, and democracy, 
and introduced a brand new and innovative culture of political participation. In 
cyberspace, activism no longer remained in the realm of face-to-face personal 
connections. The rise and fall of social movements have become an outcome of 
advancements in Internet skills and technological opportunities for forming coalitions 
with the public mind.87 While earlier democratic protests seem detached from the rest of 
the world, recent political movements, the Umbrella Revolution in particular, gained 
international recognition. From protest images to political artwork (see image below), 
media platforms were extensively applied to galvanize the movement. Support for the 
movement became global, and the platform for democratic discussions greatly expanded. 
Within a few days, the yellow umbrella quickly became an easily recognizable yet 
powerful symbol, demonstrating solidarity and resistance.  
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 As social media becomes a useful tool for social activism, youngsters find it more 
and more convenient to maneuver the Internet with its high flexibility, low cost, and high 
speed. Although as of year 2010, television still remains the most popular channel for 
learning about political activities, in Table 4.5, the Post-80s and Post-90s have a much 
higher tendency to use “Electronic communications” than the Post-70s generation. They 
slowly move away from the more conventional forms of media, such as newspapers, 
radio, and even television.  
 
Table 4.5  - Channels for Learning About Demonstrations or Rallies to be 
Organized (multiple responses allowed) 
 
Source: CUHK (2010), “Social Attitude of the Youth in Hong Kong,” P.37. 
 
The incorporation of social media into political action directly alters the political 
culture of Hong Kong society. Freedom of speech in the Internet domain breaks free of 
traditional confinements of elitist participation, and allows for mass engagement on the 
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popular level. Even though young political activists participate in “both conventional 
(election) and unconventional (social movements)” methods of local politics, changing 
societal values drive them to “shun traditional forms of participation, such as voting and 
political parties, in favor of unconventional tactics, expressive and elite-challenging mass 
action, through loosely organized civic networks.” 88 Youth participation in 
unconventional tactics may indicate their own lack of confidence in influencing 
government decisions. They adhere to a bottom-up approach due to the deficient 
“electoral institutions and the low integration of civil society.”89 The long simmering 
growth of civic awareness has finally emerged to the surface of society, boldly exhibiting 
its revolutionary and progressive characteristics of democracy, searching for a like-
minded political community.  
 When asked about democratic progress in Hong Kong since 1997, majority of the 
youth population believe that it is too slow. In Table 4.6, the middle age group (20-29) 
has the highest tendency (62.6%) to believe that the progress for democracy is too slow. 
Moreover, on average, majority of all age groups (54.3%) believe that democratic 
progress has been too slow, while very few people (5.4%) believe that it has been too 
fast.  
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Table 4.6 - Democratic Progress since 1997 
 
Source: CUHK (2015), “Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong: A Follow-Up Study,” P.22 
 
Corresponding to perceptions on democratic progress is social attitudes toward 
the Occupy Central movement (or Umbrella Revolution) for universal suffrage by 2017. 
In Table 4.7, close to 60% of respondents in the middle age group (20-29) “support or 
strongly support” the movement. Both youth groups (15-19 and 20-29) show a higher 
tendency to support the movement. Attitudes towards the movement are split amongst the 
oldest group (30-39), with 46.7% supporting the movement, and 46.4% indicating the 
opposite. Across all age groups, near 54% of respondents support the movement. It is 
important to note that there is a strong correlation between people’s perception of 
democracy and their methods of political participation. If one considers the Occupy 
Movement too radical, he or she may also believe in more modest and gradual strategies 
for achieving democracy.  
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Table 4.7 - Support “Occupy Central” for Genuine Universal Suffrage in 2017 Chief 
Executive Election 
 
Source: CUHK (2015), “Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong: A Follow-Up Study,” P.18 
 
In conclusion for the data analysis, the middle age group (20-29) has shown the 
strongest level of dissent toward the present political and economic conditions in Hong 
Kong. Both younger generations (15-19 and 20-29) have a higher tendency to associate 
with the Hong Kong identity, support the Occupy Movement, and indicate strong distrust 
towards the Central Government. Demographically speaking, social attitudes in the youth 
population (15-19 and 20-29) are not divided. However, there is a significant divergence 
in the ideological orientations between the younger and older generations. After all, the 
political and economic circumstances have greatly transformed in the past few decades in 
Hong Kong history, resulting in distinct social experiences for different generations.  
An integral part of the numerous changes that have taken place in Hong Kong is 
the emergence of a political consciousness that has been simmering even prior to 1997. 
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This phenomenon has particularly been prominent amongst the youth populations. Some 
believe that the student-led Umbrella Revolution marks the “watershed of the political 
movements in Hong Kong.”90 Considering the sacredness of Hong Kong’s outstanding 
capitalist economy and a lingering presence of traditional social values, the notion of 
non-cooperation itself challenges the socio-political ideology of the city. Contemporary 
Hong Kong society presents to us a new form of reality, one that focuses on popular 
dissent of the youth population. Social movements created by the youth counterbalances 
oppressive forces and transcends into a powerful form of symbolic cultural identity. The 
Hong Kongese identity, in turn, becomes a possibility for counter-hegemonic expression. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
It is a fallacy of the radical youth to demand all or nothing, and to view every partial 
activity as compromise. Either engage in something that will bring revolution and 
transformation all at one blow, or do nothing, it seems to say. But compromise is 
really only a desperate attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. It is not compromise to 
study to understand the world in which one lives, to seek expression for one’s inner 
life, to work to harmonize it and make it an integer, nor is it compromise to work in 
some small sphere for the harmonization of social life and the relations between men 
who work together, a harmonization that will bring democracy into every sphere of 
life.91  
-Randolph S. Bourne, 
Youth and Life (1913) 
 
Now that the umbrellas have been folded, the revolutionaries themselves are 
asking, so what is the price of democracy? Some of them have missed school, others have 
skipped work; some have been beaten up, tortured, and interrogated; very few even lost 
their lives. Was the struggle worthwhile after all? Should they have given up on the faint 
hopes of democratic principles, and searched for a more realistic version of compromise?  
In order to answer these questions, we must first acknowledge that in the process 
of the democratic movement, a new political culture has been nurtured. The Umbrella 	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Revolution has encouraged countless number of ordinary Hong Kong citizens to speak up 
and engage in various forms of political participation. The recent trends of political 
participation has led me to question the motives and interests behind the new wave of 
democratic movements in Hong Kong. This thesis argues that the Umbrella Revolution in 
Hong Kong is more than just democratization - it reflects a larger identity crisis that has 
been ongoing in society, which separates the Hong Kong from the Chinese. The vast 
amount of implications of the movement unfolds are indicative that the nature of public 
sentiments extends beyond universal suffrage. It concerns the manifestations of cultural 
and political ideologies of what it means to be Hong Kongese.  
In light of the democratic movement, the first two chapters establish historical and 
contextual grounds for the rest of the thesis, and provide three major theoretical 
frameworks that have emerged in and around the Umbrella Revolution, namely, the 
government position, democratic movement theory, and the ethnic identity theory. I 
describe the various legal, institutional and ideological components of the current 
political system of Hong Kong. Relationships between the Sino-British treaty and Basic 
Law of Hong Kong, the Central Government’s position and popular opinions, the 
academic voices from the University of Hong Kong, the political parties, the C.Y. Leung 
administration, etc., represented themselves as reactionary and counter-reactionary forces 
of the democratic movement that are striving to take center stage in the ongoing political 
debate. They form into an intricate nexus of power configurations that manifest in Hong 
Kong society.  
However, my investigation of the web of interconnectedness of power dynamics 
is not geared towards an institutional analysis of realist strategies, but rather a 
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demonstration of how a unique Hong Kongese identity grows and multiplies under the 
current political conditions. The voice of the ethnic identity theory becomes the core of 
the discussion in Chapter 3 on the problem of identity. In this chapter, I examine the 
different aspects of how Beijing’s strategy of mainlandization combined with the social 
stratification in Hong Kong has produced a divergence in cultural identities of different 
groups in society. While the rich have largely supported Beijing’s political stances, youth 
and grassroots became the principle advocates of the democratic movement, as they also 
find themselves identifying closely with the Hong Kongese identity. Moreover, to get 
beyond the linear understandings of Hong Kong and Chinese identities, I establish the 
grey areas, in-betweens, and the duality of such ambiguous concepts by delving deeper 
into the colonial history of Hong Kong and the tradition of Chinese intellectual thought. 
Contrary to majority of the mainstream studies on the psychoanalytic dynamics of 
Chinese identities, this thesis focuses on the formation and metamorphosis of identities 
from a Hong Kong perspective. The rich and contextual analysis of this chapter 
contributes into its conclusion that a symbolic cultural identity is required for collective 
political participation.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis primarily focuses on the manifestation of youth political 
participation in Hong Kong society. As cultural identities should not be understood 
simply as personal experiences, I introduce an empirical analysis on the intertwined 
relationship between identity and politics, hegemony and resistance. Major findings of 
the chapter include a strong negative correlation between the Hong Kongese identity and 
public sentiments, which indicates that when the government and society appraisal rates 
are high, people tend to have more favorable opinions toward the Central Government. 
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This chapter also complicates the ethnic identity theory mentioned in previous chapters 
by demonstrating a divide within Hong Kong society among the rich and poor and the old 
and young. Youth populations in Hong Kong have a higher tendency to associate with the 
Hong Kong identity, support the Occupy Movement, and indicate strong distrust towards 
the Central Government. As a result, the empirical analysis reveals that recent trends in 
youth politics and youth political participation is evident. Such trends show that not only 
do the stages of metamorphosis of Hong Kongese identity follow the patterns of political 
dissent, but that political and economic forces have formidable abilities in shaping and 
transforming the vicissitudes of such terms. Thus, the Umbrella Revolution of the youth 
counterbalances oppressive forces and becomes a channel for counter-hegemonic 
expression.  
It can be said that a longing for energizing democratic visions, the pursuit of 
idealistic humanitarian goals, and the chase after powerful stories that are grander than 
themselves are present in youth populations across the globe. The narrative of the 
Umbrella Revolution has become emancipating for younger generations living under 
political oppression and economic slump. When taken together, these fascinating 
narratives of contemporary democratic struggles are no longer isolated incidents, but 
transform into an ingrained belief that a revolution must contain magical powers of 
redemption, for both the mind and the soul.  
In post-colonial Hong Kong, democratic literature thrives in the time of identity 
crisis, and through our imaginations, these narratives tend to function as a resolution to 
the relevant crisis. When discussing the democratic ideologies of the youth, on one hand, 
it is necessary to address the wide ranges of individual fever and fear; and on the other, 
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collective frenzy towards the notion of revolution not only function as a societal 
commentary on the gradual decay of contemporary Hong Kong society, but also 
demonstrate a powerful ability to reconfigure our standards and values through fantastical 
narratives.  
Now, besides the psychological connotations of the popularity of democratic 
literature, youth intellectual thought is also a field that should be taken seriously and 
given appropriate approval. Although framing political goals in idealism may not sound 
pragmatic enough, young activists in Hong Kong have expressed that “the core of our 
idealism rests in our concern about the land and its people… Only within this idealism 
can we resist the kind of instrumental rationality … presupposed by our city’s dying 
model of elections in the legislature … and by the rhetoric and logic of our middle-class 
democracy.”92 They believe that in order to hold on to the core values of Hong Kong 
society and gather its collective inertia, one must not yield to mediocre improvements, or 
incremental change. They strive for a vision of democracy that is closely correlated to the 
individual ethos, one that relies on individual political awareness to enact on the public 
sphere.  
The narratives of the rising political youth culture have both strengths and 
limitations. We must take into consideration the fragility of the Communist ego, the 
boundaries of legitimacy and security, the economic realities, and the ironclad stance of 
Beijing on the issue of sovereignty. Such realities warn Hong Kong people of the dangers 
of going against the tide of Chinese hegemony. However, Hong Kong’s youth have also 
significantly contributed to the development of civil awareness and political 	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consciousness in society at large. The Occupy Movement’s referendum has forced the 
silent majority to pick a side and vote over issues on electoral politics. The Umbrella 
Revolution has roused a sense of justice across all ages and genders. The democratic 
movement has created a space where ideal forms of civil participation may take place in 
the public sphere. Students have demonstrated an adamant determination in their quest 
for democracy as they banded together with a brim vision of hope, pain, frustration, and 
fear.  
So, what is the price of democracy? At the end of the day, Hong Kong society 
may still be in search for reconciliation between idealism and reality. The youths may 
even become disillusioned by the harsh consequences of political hegemony, as their 
hearts have already been crushed by police batons, their eyes been drenched by pepper 
spray. But the Umbrella Revolution is not over yet. The pursuit of democracy will be a 
continual progress, and this is just the beginning. Hopes and fears of Hong Kong people 
are so closely tied to their political ideologies that they transform into a platform for these 
silenced voices to fight for a better tomorrow. The umbrellas of solidarity and resistance 
will continue to linger in the minds of Hong Kong people.  
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